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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Understanding the relation between ﬁnancial structure and the real economy is crucial to assess
t h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of alternative ﬁnancial institutions. This paper focuses on the relation
between debt ﬁnance — in particular bank debt — and borrowers’ long-term competitive attitudes
interpreted in a broad sense.
The empirical work of Judith Chevalier (1995), Chevalier and David Sharfstein (1996), Dan
Kovenock and Gordon Phillips (1995, 1997), and particularly Phillips (1995) showed that in
some concentrated industries, high leverage is correlated with low output, high prices and more
passive investment behavior: debt ﬁnance appears to have anti-competitive eﬀects on at least
some product markets. More recently, cross-county studies by Nicola Cetorelli (2001, 2003),
Thorsten Beck et al. (2003) and Cetorelli and Philip Strahan (2004) showed that credit market
concentration induces concentration in downstream industries.
These ﬁndings are hardly surprising if one looks a century back at the US experience of
‘ﬁnancial capitalism’, when J.P. Morgan’s men sat on the boards of railways and shipping com-
panies, coordinating their strategies at the expense of customers.1 They are even less surprising
if one recalls that about at the same time other banks where doing approximately the same in
Austria and Germany.2 But they remain somewhat surprising for economics and ﬁnance schol-
ars, as established theories of the interaction between ﬁnancial and product markets predict
that debt should lead borrowing ﬁrms to compete more aggressively (the next section reviews
related literatures).
Inspired by the late experiences of ‘ﬁnancial capitalism’, this paper develops a formal theory
of the anti-competitive eﬀects of debt ﬁnance based on the interaction between capital structure,
managerial incentives, and ﬁrms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in product markets. The
theory explains why and how concentrated/collusive credit markets — or large banks in compet-
itive ones — may “export” collusion in otherwise competitive downstream industries. It shows
that borrowers’ commitments to prudent strategies aimed at reducing shareholders-debtholders
conﬂicts and the ex ante cost of debt ﬁnance — like choosing a CEO with a valuable reputation or
conservative incentives — also facilitate collusive behavior in product markets. Common, allied
or interlocked lenders can make these commitments credible across competitors by introduc-
ing simple debt covenants or sitting on borrowers’ boards. The combination of bank debt and
conservative managers may then have the product market eﬀects of a hidden merger, making
full collusion sustainable in industries where unleveraged ﬁrms would be unable to collude at
all. Among the policy implications of these results, discussed in depth in the last section of the
paper, are that:
— since (lack of) competition in the banking sector ‘trickles down’ to downstream industries,
credit markets should be high up on the agenda of competition authorities;
1That dominant banks could have signiﬁcant anticompetitive eﬀects on borrowing industries was very clear to
Louis Brandeis and other early 20th century US politicians who fought J.P. Morgans’ “money trust” obtaining a
substantial strengthening of antitrust laws and banking regulation. Miguel Cantillo Simon (1998) shows that a
large part of the additional ﬁrm value generated by links with J.P. Morgan came indeed from cartelization. See
also Bradford de Long (1991).
2See Martin Hellwig (1991) for a general discussion and Ulrich Wegenroth (1997) for an historical account.
2— since innovation is positively related to industry competition, enhancing credit market
competition fosters R&D investment and innovation;
—t h ec o s t so fproduct markets’ monopolization should also be taken into account when
trading oﬀ competition and ﬁnancial stability in banking;
— low contract enforceability, debtholder protection and transparency, and even easy corrup-
tion may be beneﬁcial in undermining "conservative governance structures".
Our work starts from the observation by James Brander and Michel Poitevin (1992), David
Hirshleifer and Anjan Thakor (1992), and Daron Acemoglu (1998) that by committing to
a prudent behavior through “conservative managers” shareholders can moderate the ex ante
agency cost of debt ﬁnance. We introduce this commitment opportunity in a dynamic lever-
aged oligopoly model à la Vojislav Maksimovic’s (1988, 1995) to reconsider the eﬀects of capital
structure on ﬁrms’ long-term competitive attitudes and incentives to innovate.
We ﬁnd that when shareholders can credibly com m i ta g a i n s ts t r a t e g i cd e f a u l tb yh i r i n ga
manager with an established reputation, debt needs not hinder product market collusion, as
originally found by Maksimovic, and may actually facilitate it. Commitments to debtholder-
friendly behavior through conservative managerial incentive schemes has an even stronger pro-
collusive eﬀects that reinforce those of managers’ reputational concerns.
Delegation of control is a contractual device, and its commitment value towards competitors
is greatly reduced when secret renegotiation is feasible at low cost (Mathias Dewatripont, 1988;
Michael Katz, 1991). We ﬁnd that when credit markets are concentrated/collusive, ‘allied’
lenders can make the choice of conservative managers renegotiation-proof — hence commitments
to ‘prudent’ product market strategies credible — even when secret contract renegotiation is
feasible and costless.3 Even when credit markets are competitive and ﬁrms have multiple lenders,
we show that by choosing at least one common lender — or a common set of “allied” lenders
— oligopolistic ﬁrms can credibly commit to “prudent behavior”, coordinate and enforce tacit
collusive agreements that could not be sustained otherwise, as conjectured by Brander and
Tracy Lewis (1986). When no lender is in common, independent lenders are shown able to
monopolize otherwise competitive downstream product markets by having “a man of theirs” on
the board of the ﬁrms they are not ﬁnancing; i.e. through information networks composed of
indirectly interlocking directors, each monitoring the borrowers of the competing banks.4 Bad law
enforcement and low debtholder protection are shown to hinder these conservative governance
structures: they undermine the credibility of commitments by allowing shareholders to bribe
managers, undo the conﬂict of interest introduced by debtholder-friendly incentives and induce
them to maximize proﬁts expropriating debtholders.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst formal-theoretical account of how in the early 1900s J.P.
Morgan and its counterparts in Europe facilitated collusion among borrowers to
“[create] value for shareholders by the extraction of monopoly rents from con-
sumers...” (De Long, 1991).
3The result is independent of whether the credit market is contestable, and solves both the downstream ﬁrms’
enforcement and coordination problems: it makes the joint monopoly agreement sustainable as the unique collusive
equilibrium in otherwise competitive product markets, independent of the discount rate.
4The two mechanisms that make managerial contracts renegotiation-proof in this model — third parties and
information networks — are quite general. They can confer commitment value to contracts other than those we
are focussing on.
3The results oﬀer a theoretical rationale for the evidence mentioned earlier, and for the strictly
related observation that in continental economies and Japan product markets tend to be less
competitive in than in Anglo-Saxon economies.5 They also oﬀer an explanation to Wendy
Carlin and Colin Mayer’s (2003) ﬁnding that in OECD countries the presence of large banks is
associated with lower growth in innovative industries and higher growth in mature ones.6
While testable predictions are detailed at the end of the paper, we note here that the results
are consistent with a number of other empirical regularities, among which that debt issues
are perceived as good news by the stock market (Christopher James, 1987; Milton Harris and
Arthur Raviv, 1991); that the probability of a ﬁrm undertaking an LBO is positively related
to competitors’ leverage (Paul Marsh, 1982; Chevalier, 1995); and that managerial incentives
are often low-powered (Jensen and Kevin Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999), particularly in bank-
dominated economies (Steven Kaplan, 1994a,b).7
Finally, Jeﬀrey Zwiebel (1996) has convincingly argued that an important weakness of many
models of the disciplinary role of debt is that ﬁnancial decisions must be made ex ante and must
be out of managers’ control, since debt leaves managers worse oﬀ.8 One appealing feature of
our model is that it provides a clear explanation for why managers may be willing to choose
high leverage, putting themselves under the threat of bankruptcy: a combination of debt and
conservative incentives may be a commitment to proﬁtable, collusive behavior and — for the
commitment to be credible — managers must receive a stake of the collusive rent.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and shows how
managers’ reputation and debtholder-friendly incentives aﬀect the relation between debt ﬁnance
and dynamic product-market competition. Section 3 shows how common/allied lenders can
monopolize competitive product markets by conferring credibility to commitments to “prudent
management.” Section 4 considers multiple, asymmetric, independent lenders and “bankers on
boards”. Section 5 discusses extensions, policy implications and related literature. Section 6
concludes with some testable predictions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Debtholder-friendly managers and collusive behavior
Maksimovic (1988, 1995) studies a dynamic leveraged oligopoly model in which ﬁrms repay their
debt by periodic installments (coupons), which can alternatively be thought of as repayments of
several debt contracts with diﬀerent maturities, and ﬁnds a monotone negative relation between
a ﬁrm leverage and its ability to sustain tacit collusion.9 We begin by sketching a dynamic
5See e.g. Marcus Noland (1995), Yoshiro Miwa (1996), or Maki Atsushi (1998).
6Protecting mature industries from competition ensures high returns (collusive margins) in these safe sectors;
this may have been one way banks have steered investment away from risky, innovative sectors. This also suggests
that the more competitive and fragmented ﬁnancial market may have been an important factor behind the recent
increase in US’ technological lead.
7Brian Hall and Jeﬀrey Liebmann (1998) document how stock-related incentives increased US managers’
pay-performance sensitivity in recent years. Consistent with the results of the present paper, a comparable
stock-options never took place in more bank-oriented countries, while Giancarlo Spagnolo (2000) shows that US
managers’ stock-options are also typically designed so that product-market competition is softened.
8In Zwiebel’s words: “[...] this contrasts with common perception of leveraged choices being in the domain of
standard managerial decisions. Managers commonly undertake capital decisions without any apparent extraordi-
nary external threat.” For example, in the leveraged buyout wave of the ’80s it was managers who usually took
the initiative, and increases in leverage were accompanied by simultaneous changes in managerial incentives.
9An analogous result is found by Rune Stenbacka (1994), who extends Maksimovic’s model to the case of
demand uncertainty, and by Ulrich Hege (1998), who characterizes the relative pro-competitiveness of bank vs.
4leveraged oligopoly model à la Maksimovic, that can be also be interpreted in terms of R&D
competition, and by describing his main result; we then use the model as a workhorse for our
analysis of “conservative governance structures”.
2.1 Set up and benchmark results
Let there be N identical ﬁrms competing in an inﬁnitely repeated product market oligopoly.
Time is discrete, ﬁrms discount future proﬁts through a common discount rate r and repeat-
edly play an oligopoly stage game with a unique non-cooperative pure-strategy Cournot-Nash
equilibrium (standard speciﬁcations of Cournot and homogeneous or diﬀerentiated Bertrand
oligopolies satisfy this requirement). Let πA
i denote the proﬁt realized by a ﬁrm i in a period
when all ﬁrms stick to the prescriptions of a stationary collusive agreement A that coordinates
all relevant market variables, and πNC
i denote the same ﬁrm’s proﬁta tt h eu n i q u eC o u r n o t - N a s h
equilibrium of the stage game. Abusing notation, we let b πA
i denote one-period proﬁts from uni-
laterally deviating from A and choosing the static best response strategy while other ﬁrms stick
to A;a n dπA
i the one-period proﬁts from sticking to A when another ﬁrm deviates unilaterally.
Under standard speciﬁcations the underlying oligopoly stage-game has the strategic structure




i .10 For the interpretation of ﬁrms compet-
ing in R&D, we assume that R&D spillovers are not too strong (so that non cooperative R&D
investments are higher than collusive ones) and that the advantage induced by a period’s R&D
investment expires at the end of that period.11
The collusive agreement A can then be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium in the
dynamic game by grim-trigger strategies (“respect A as long as everybody does it, if a defection
is observed play the static Nash equilibrium forever,” James Friedman, 1971) if short-run gains
















Suppose ﬁrms simultaneously increase leverage by issuing long-term debt or, as in Maksimovic,
that when the industry was founded all ﬁrms simultaneously issued debt in the form of bonds
sold for a lump-sum amount Di against the obligation to pay bondholders an amount bi in every
following period, with Di = bi
r . In each period ﬁrms are free to distribute dividends after having
paid the coupon bi.I fi no n ep e r i o daﬁrm cannot meet its debt-service obligation, bankruptcy
occurs. Bankrupt ﬁrms are sold to new proﬁt-maximizing owners.12 The period after a ﬁrm
publicly traded debt.
10This is always the case for Cournot and (omogeneous or diﬀerentiated) Bertrand competition, and it the case
with R&D competition as long as spillovers are not too strong (see e.g. Xavier Vives, 2003).
11This ensures that the product market game is stationary, as in Maksimovic. All the results we derive apply
also if ﬁrms compete simply on output or price. Also, the results do not depend on the stationarity of the product
market game. It will become clear that — at the cost of substantial complication and lengthening of the model
— fully analogous results could be obtained with a non-stationary dynamic product market game such as that
studied by Volker Nocke (2000).
12The alternative assumption, that after bankruptcy ﬁrms exit from the product market, readily transforms
the model into a “predation” one. It can easily be shown that in this case debt makes collusion impossible: it
greatly increases ﬁrms’ incentives to deviate, drive competitors bankrupt, and monopolize the market, while no
credible punishment is available to ﬁrms as a deterrent.
5becomes bankrupt old shareholders — or whoever else is in charge of running the ﬁrm before
it is sold to new owners — have a short horizon and therefore maximize short-run proﬁts.13
The condition for the collusive agreement to be respected by each ﬁrm i under the threat of
grim-trigger strategies becomes
πA




























As long as bi ≤ πNC





and condition (2) reduces to (1). Instead, at higher levels of leverage, with πNC
















By inspection, at this level of debt condition (2) becomes more stringent and collusion more
diﬃcult to sustain (r∗∗ decreases) when ﬁrm leverage increases, pushing the coupon bi up towards
πA
i . This is Maksimovic’s (1988, 1995) main result.
2.2 Managers’ reputation, bankruptcy and collusion
Maksimovic’s result is derived under the standard assumption of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. How-
ever, large ﬁrms are led by managers whose incentives may not perfectly coincide with share-
holders’ objectives.14 Even when incentive contracts are so well designed as to lead managers
to maximize shareholders’ discounted proﬁts under normal conditions, top managers face extra
costs when their ﬁrm goes bankrupt. For professional managers bankruptcy implies a substantial
loss of reputation, together with either the loss of the job, or a drastic wage cut.15 Moreover,
lenders often explicitly ask shareholders to hire top managers with a particularly solid reputation
for “prudent behavior,” who have much to lose from driving the ﬁrm into bankruptcy.16
Managers’ reputational costs of bankruptcy have already been taken into account in classical
models addressing ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial policy (Stephen Ross, 1977; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992) or
business cycles (Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz, 1990, 1993), it is therefore time to analyze
their eﬀects on product markets. Herer we modify ﬁrms’ objective function to incorporate such
costs as in Ross (1977). Managers’ direct costs from ﬁnancial distress may be ﬁxed, or may vary
depending on “how bad” ﬁnancial problems are. To consider both cases we let Ci ≥ 0 denote
the ﬁxed loss that a manager incurs when his ﬁrm can’t meet debt service obligations, and let
13Maksimovic notes that after bankruptcy is declared shareholders are indiﬀerent about proﬁts, so that many
static equilibria exist, but that the most reasonable assumption is that the Cournot-Nash one is played.
14Classical references include Herbert Simon (1957), William Baumol (1958), Oliver Williamson (1964), and
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
15Stuart Gilson (1989) and Gilson and Michael Vetsuypens (1993) ﬁnd that about half of the managers of ﬁrms
facing ﬁnancial distress are replaced and are not re-hired by comparable (exchanged-listed) ﬁrms for the following
three years; and that those who are retained experience very large reductions in salary and bonuses.
16Gilson (1989) ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant number of changes of management are initiated by creditors, e.g. during
debt restructuring.
6ci(bi − πi), with ci ≥ 0, be a variable managerial cost increasing with the amount of debt the
ﬁrm cannot honor. To simplify exposition it is also useful to deﬁne Ci = Ci + ci(bi − πNC
i ).
To isolate the eﬀects of debt and bankruptcy on managerial behavior and tacit collusion we
focus on managers under a long-term proﬁt-sharing compensation plan, which leads them to
maximize an objective function equivalent in all aspects to that of shareholders except in the
evaluation of bankruptcy.
Deﬁnition 1 Net proﬁt sharing long-term contract (NPS): In every period managers
are paid a ﬁxed wage (normalized to zero, together with the reservation wage) plus a share of the
period’s net proﬁts, α(πt
i − bi)+,w i t h0 <α<1.17
The following lemma will be useful below.
Lemma 1 When ﬁrms are led by managers under NPS contracts, debt and managerial bankruptcy
costs do not aﬀect the Nash equilibrium of the static market game.
The long-term incentive contract between a manager and an owner ends when a change
of control occurs. Therefore, after bankruptcy, debtholders can choose whether to replace old
managers, or to retain them at a wage reduced by the negative eﬀects of bankruptcy on their
reservation wage. Suppose ﬁrst that debtholders replace managers when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
With managers under NPS contracts and positive managerial bankruptcy costs, the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the manager being willing to respect a stationary, collusive agreement














for bi ≤ πNC





















for bi >π NC
i . Suppose instead that managers are retained after bankruptcy. Condition (3)
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Comparing these conditions with (2) one obtains the following.
Lemma 2 Suppose managers are under long-term NPS contracts. Then:
(i) If leverage is “low” (0 ≤ bi ≤ πNC
i ), managerial bankruptcy costs do not aﬀect ﬁrms’
ability to collude.
(ii) If leverage is “high” (bi >π NC
i ) and managers are replaced when bankruptcy occurs,
positive managerial bankruptcy costs (Ci > 0) increase the maximum discount rate (decrease
17Gross proﬁt sharing contracts have even stronger eﬀects, since then the manager’s wage is not aﬀected by
ﬁnancial transactions and the negative eﬀect of debt on collusion found by Maksimovic disappears by assumption.
7the minimum discount factor) at which ﬁrms can support any collusive agreement in subgame
perfect equilibrium.
(iii) If leverage is “high” (bi >π NC
i ) and managers are not replaced when bankruptcy occurs,
managerial bankruptcy costs increase the maximum discount rate at which ﬁrms can support any







For positive levels of bankruptcy costs there is a range of “high” debt levels — increasing
in such costs — at which (3a) and (3b) are both strictly less stringent than (1). However, (3a)
and (3b) are the relevant conditions only if bankruptcy does eventually occur. When (1) is
not satisﬁed — provided managers are unconstrained regarding dividend policy — a manager
that defects from collusive strategies has enough cash to avoid bankruptcy. He can either use
short-run gains from deviation to buy back all debt, or retain and invest them at the market
rate r to pay future coupons. Then the incentive compatibility condition for collusion to be
supported by managers under NPS contracts is not aﬀected by bankruptcy costs, it is precisely
condition (1). If, instead, managers are restricted to pay out part of the realized proﬁts as
dividends, then even when (1) is not satisﬁed it can be impossible for a deviating manager
to avoid bankruptcy. Then, suﬃciently high managerial bankruptcy costs can indeed revert
Maksimovic’s result making collusion easier for highly leveraged ﬁrms than for unleveraged
ones. The following proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 1 Suppose managers are under NPS contracts. Then:
(i) When managers are unconstrained regarding dividend policy and their bankruptcy costs
are large, high leverage (with bi >π NC
i ) does not limit ﬁrms’ ability to collude.
(ii) When managers are constrained to pay out (part or all) realized proﬁts as dividends and
managerial bankruptcy costs are large, high leverage (with bi >π NC
i ) enhances ﬁrms’ ability
to collude (highly leveraged ﬁrms can sustain any given collusive agreement at strictly higher
discount rates than unleveraged ﬁrms).
2.3 Debtholder-friendly managerial incentive schemes
Suppose now that there are no reputational costs of bankruptcy. Shouldn’t informed lenders be
expected to anticipate the strategic default problem identiﬁed by Maksimovic, and ask for some
alternative form of commitment before lending money to limitedly liable borrowers? Hirshlifer
and Thakor (1992), Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Acemoglu (1998) showed that low-powered
managerial incentive schemes can do at least as well in inducing managers to take into account
debtholders’ interests. Brander and Poitevin (1992), in particular, consider two kinds of man-
agerial incentive schemes: a penalty contract, which gives managers a ﬁxed salary W when
the ﬁrm is solvent, and the same salary minus a penalty T when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt (where
T may consist simply of the managers’ bankruptcy costs discussed in the previous section); and
the widely used bonus contract, which implies a per-period wage composed of a salary W plus
a ﬁxed monetary bonus B paid only in periods in which the ﬁrm’s accounting proﬁts are above a
target level πB. They show that in their model the bonus contract is an “optimal contract,” since
through a suitable choice of the target πB it leads to the ex ante ﬁrst best outcome, maximizing
ﬁrm value.
For the sake of simplicity, in evaluating the product-market eﬀects of these contracts we focus
on the case where managers are replaced after bankruptcy, and assume that when a manager
8is indiﬀerent among two or more available strategies he chooses the one that maximizes ﬁrm’s
proﬁts.18 Also — to abstract from the reputational issues considered in the previous section —
we assume that managers’ reservation wage is not aﬀected by bankruptcy, and we maintain its
normalization to zero (without loss of generality). We have the following.
Proposition 2 A) Suppose shareholders hire managers under “penalty contracts” to reduce the
agency costs of debt ﬁnance. Then:
(i) When managers are unconstrained regarding dividend policy, leverage does not aﬀect
ﬁrms’ ability to collude.
(ii) When managers are committed to distribute net proﬁts as dividends, highly leveraged
ﬁrms (bi >π NC
i ) can support any feasible stationary proﬁt stream that leaves ﬁrms solvent in
subgame perfect equilibrium in the market supergame at any level of the discount rate.
B) Suppose shareholders hire managers under “bonus contracts” to reduce the agency costs
of debt ﬁnance. Then any stationary collusive agreement that allows managers to receive their
bonuses can be supported in subgame-perfect equilibrium in the market supergame at any level of
the discount rate.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rp a r tA )i st h a tt h ep e n a l t yT has the same pro-collusive eﬀect as the
reputational costs of bankruptcy analyzed in the previous section, while the ﬂat wage removes
any incentive for managers to deviate from a collusive agreement. One might have expected that
the apparently more aggressive bonus contracts would not have so striking pro-collusive eﬀects,
but part B) shows that quite the opposite is true. The reason is that the bonus incentive scheme,
as the penalty one, is “capped.”19 If managers can sustain a stationary collusive agreement
delivering per-period proﬁts higher than, or equal to the trigger level πB, they will have no
incentive whatsoever to deviate. They cannot capture any further gain from a deviation, while
the following punishment phase makes them lose future bonuses independent of whether their
ﬁrm goes bankrupt. And this holds whatever the discount rate is.
These results reinforce Brander and Poitevin’s argument that the relatively low power of
managers’ incentive schemes found by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others could be at-
tributed to the role of “conservative” managerial contracts as commitments towards borrowers:
in oligopolies, conservative incentives introduce a conﬂict of interest between shareholders and
managers that however reduces the agency costs of debt ﬁnance and softens competition in the
product market, thereby increasing proﬁts.20 It is also worth noting the following.
Remark The pro-collusive eﬀects of manager’s reputational costs of bankruptcy (identiﬁed in
the previous section) and of conservative incentive schemes are independent and reinforce
each other: the overall pro-collusive eﬀect of conservative “managers” is given by the sum
of the collusive eﬀects of managers’ reputational costs of bankruptcy and of conservative
managerial incentive schemes.
18This eliminates a multiplicity of weak stage-game equilibria in subgames where managers run ﬁrms but and
are indiﬀerent about the oucome. Alternatively, one could assume that managers’ compensation contains a small
proﬁt-sharing component, or that managers own a small amount of the ﬁrm’s shares.
19Bonus schemes used in the real world are almost always capped (Murphy, 1999).












Figure 1: Commitment and renegotiation in a vertical structure
3 The role of banks
We have been working under the implicit assumption that shareholders’ choice of a top man-
ager and of his incentive contract is an eﬀective commitment device towards both, lenders and
competitors. However, under a collusive product market agreement shareholders (and debthold-
ers) would have incentives to secretly renegotiate their managers’ contract and undo the initial
commitment.
3.1 Bank relations and secret renegotiation
As pointed out by Dewatripont (1988) and Katz (1991), the commitment value of contracts with
third parties can be greatly reduced by agents’ ability to secretly renegotiate the contract. This
problem is sketched in Figure 1, where example A represents the situation before delegation,
B the situation after delegation (a manager moderates debtholders/shareholders conﬂicts on
product market strategies), and C the possibility that shareholders secretly renegotiate their
manager’s contract.
Acemoglu (1998) considers this possibility and shows that leaving suﬃcient rents to man-
agers could block secret renegotiation within one vertical structure by making it too expensive
for owners.21 Though, when competing vertical structures seek commitment towards each other
—c o m m i t m e n tbetween structures — under perfect information neither a covenant, nor rents,
nor other contractual arrangements within one structure can prevent renegotiation.22 In our
21This solution, however, requires that in equilibrium part of the manager’s rents are paid by the lender, i.e.
that the manager is simultaneously on the payroll of both bank and ﬁrm, a seldom observed arrangement.
22When one structure use contracts to commit and aﬀect the strategy of competing structures, secretly undoing
the commitment it can secure itself additional gains that can be redistributed internally to achieve the Pareto














Figure 2: Renegotiation and commitment between vertical structures
example, suppose two competing bank-ﬁrm-manager structures commit through internal man-
agerial contracts to prudent, collusive product market strategies not sustainable otherwise. Each
vertical structure would then strictly gain by secretly renegotiating the internal contract and
unilaterally defecting from the product market agreement. This case is described in Figure 2-A,
where debtholders and shareholders agree to renegotiate their manager’s conservative contract
to obtain and share gains from a unilateral defection in the product market.
We show now that a “relation” between lenders — as described in Figure 2-B — may lead these
to internalize the externalities they impose on each other through borrowers, block renegotiation
and confer commitment value to “conservative governance structures.”
3.1.1 Related lenders
There are several conceivable “relations” that may lead lenders to internalize the externalities
they impose on each other through borrowers.
Common lender. The more obvious case is that in which the two lenders are in fact the
same one, where ﬁrms borrow from the same bank, an extreme but common form of “relation
between lenders” described in Figure 3-A.
Cooperative relations. When the banking industry is highly concentrated, lenders may col-
lude. But even in fragmented and competitive credit markets, independent banks are often
involved in long-term (explicit or implicit) cooperative agreements, e.g. in information sharing,
interbank lending, syndacated ﬁnancing etc. Allied banks could then internalize externalities
and behave as one bank towards borrowers. Figure 3-B refers to this situation.
Ownership relations. Distinct banks may belong to the same group, they can be directly or
indirectly controlled by the same holding, as described in Figure 3-C. Again, banks controlled by
the same entity would internalize externalities, behaving as a common lender towards borrowers.
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Figure 3:
3.1.2 Additional assumptions
For the sake of crispness, in the remainder of the paper we will refer to a “common lender” L
with the understanding that this can be one bank or several banks acting cooperatively. Also, we
now restrict attention to a product market duopoly (the N-ﬁrm case being fully analogous and
more cumbersome), where managers that drive their ﬁrm bankrupt are replaced; and we retain
the normalization of managers’ reservation wage to zero. In addition, to sharpen our results
and emphasize the power of bank debt as a collusive device we adopt the following extreme
(pro-competitive) assumptions:
Assumption 1 Secret contract renegotiation is feasible and costless.23
Assumption 2 Condition (1) is not satisﬁed by any collusive agreement.
Assumption 3 Lenders own no shares in borrowing ﬁrms, nor control proxy votes in their
shareholders meetings.
3.2 Common lenders, covenants and collusion
Suppose at the foundation of the industry, or in any other period τ, ﬁrms raise debt ﬁnance
from a common lender L under the covenant that the ﬁrm is run by a given manager under
lender-friendly incentive compensation as long as there is outstanding debt. For example, the
debt contract could be as follows.
23It should be clear at this point that allowing for positive costs of renegotiation can only reinforce our results.
Frictions in renegotiation, such as asymmetic information at the contracting stage, would give direct commitment
power to observable contracts (see Mathias Dewatripont, 1988; Paolo Fulghieri and S Nagarajan 1992; and Bernard
Caillaud et al. 1995).
12Deﬁnition 2 The Debt Contract: “Shareholders receive today the amount of cash Di against
the promise of the coupon payment bi in each future period, where Di = bi
r − gi, if an external
manager is hired as CEO under a long-term bonus contract —a sd e ﬁned in the previous section,
with Wi normalized to 0,a n dBi > 0 —w i t ht a r g e tp r o ﬁts πB
i ≥ πNC
i ; the managers’ contract
cannot be modiﬁed without the agreement of the lender (as long as debt is in place). ”
Here gi denotes the amount of future collusive proﬁts that the lender extracts in advance
from each ﬁrm by selling overpriced debt.
Since the lender is aware of shareholders’ incentives to secretly renegotiate the manager’s
contract, we assume he will make sure that the contract forbids the manager from accepting
additional/parallel forms of compensation (in particular from the owner), and that penalties for
contract/covenant infringement are suﬃciently high for both owner and manager.
Consider ﬁr s ta“ l o w ”d e b tc o n t r a c t(bi ≤ πNC
i ). When leverage is low the common lender
loses little from a deviation in the product market, since ﬁrms are able to repay debt even
when they are stuck at the static Nash equilibrium. Moreover, L may gain from a deviation
by obtaining control of the non-deviating ﬁrm if this can’t meet the coupon the period of the
deviation. Because shareholders’ gains from deviating from a collusive agreement are suﬃcient
to compensate the manager for the loss of future bonuses and to induce him to deviate, all
required parties may eventually agree to a joint secret renegotiation of debt and managerial
contracts, leading to a deviation from the collusive agreement. Still, we can state what follows.
Lemma 3 (i) At very low levels of debt, such that bi ≤ πA
i <π NC
i ∀i, managerial bonus
contracts are not renegotiation-proof and leverage does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ ability to collude.
(ii) At low levels of debt, such that πA
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debt makes managers’ contracts renegotiation-proof and collusion sustainable; it does not aﬀect
ﬁrms’ ability to collude otherwise.
That is, even low levels of debt, with bi smaller but close to πNC
i , can facilitate collusion by
making sure that if a ﬁrm deviates, the lender loses from the side of the other ﬁrm it ﬁnanced.
When shareholders’ net gains from deviation are small, compensating the lender for this loss is
not possible and renegotiation cannot occur. This eﬀect becomes much stronger with “high”
debt levels (bi >π NC
i ). Then we can state the following.
Lemma 4 Suppose a “high” debt contract (bi >π NC
i ) is accepted by both owners. Then:
( i )A sl o n ga s




for given managerial bonuses Bi,t a r g e tp r o ﬁt levels πB
i , and collusive proﬁts πA
i (πA
i ≥ πB
i ),t h e
maximum discount rate at which the managerial contracts are renegotiation-proof is higher than
that at which owners can collude, and is monotonically increasing in ﬁrms’ leverage.
(ii) As long as




for given managerial bonuses Bi,t a r g e tp r o ﬁt levels πB




contracts are renegotiation-proof and collusion supportable at any level of the discount rate.
13That is, for higher levels of debt there is a smooth positive relation between ﬁrms’ leverage
and the ability of the debt contract to confer credibility to conservative managerial contracts.24
The debt contract makes collusion supportable at discount rates at which unleveraged owners
cannot collude, and for high enough leverage full collusion becomes supportable at any level of
the discount rate. We can now state this section’s main result.
Proposition 3 A debt contract with bi = πB
i = πM
i − Bi with each ﬁrm i makes managerial
contracts renegotiation-proof and implements the joint monopoly agreement as the unique sub-
game perfect stationary collusive equilibrium in the product market, independent of the discount
rate.





r ), accepting the debt contract is owners’ strictly dominant strategy.
In other words, everybody happy — shareholders, debtholders, and managers — but con-
sumers. We will refer to these collusive equilibria as “conservative governance structures”. The
discounted ﬂow of bonuses is the stake of the collusive rent appropriated by managers, and can
be interpreted as the intrinsic cost of the commitment technology.
3.3 Discussion
3.3.1 Credit market competition
Proposition 3 applies independently of how competitive or contestable is the loan market. In
the equilibria we characterized, lender(s), managers and shareholders share the collusive rent
from the product market. With little credit market competition the lender has most bargaining





r −gi) that guarantees acceptance (analogous reasoning applies to managers).
Increased credit market competition reduces the bargaining power of the lender, redistributing
collusive rent (the size of gi) towards shareholders (and managers), but leaves all else unchanged.
Even with a perfectly competitive loan market, as long as ﬁrms borrow from the same (coalition
of) lender(s), this could internalize product market externalities and guarantee the credibility of
commitments to conservative product market strategies, although it won’t capture much of the
rent.25 By shifting the distribution of the collusive rent from the common/allied lender(s) to
the many downstream borrowers, credit market competition reduces the lender’s incentive to set
up such “conservative governance structures”. It does increase the ﬁrms’ incentives to take the
initiative, but to a much lesser extent: insofar as borrowers are many, independent and subject
to antitrust laws, they will face additional coordination costs, free riding, and the risk of being
ﬁned by the competition authorities that the common lender does not facer. This observation
leads to the following.
Corollary 1 Suppose that borrowing ﬁrms face positive coordination costs (e.g. are many,
and/or subject to antitrust laws), and that for each agent the incentive to form “conservative
24Whether managerial contracts are renegotiation-proof may depend on the discount rate because the lender’s
losses from a deviation are in terms of expected future repayments.
25One diﬀerence with competing lenders is that ﬁrm owners could secretly borrow from an other lender to “buy
back debt” towards L and then induce the manager to defect from the collusive agreement. This, however, would
not be proﬁtable: L could refuse to sell back the debt, and even if it could not, it would ﬁnd convenient to alert
the other ﬁrm, so that it would also simultaneously defect leaving no proﬁts to the ﬁrstr ﬁrm.
14governance structures” increases with the net expected share of the collusive rent. Then the
stronger credit market competition, the smaller are agents’ incentives to establish conservative
governance structures.
3.3.2 Corruption
Although ex-ante shareholders ﬁnd in their interest to enter “conservative governance struc-
tures”, ex-post they have incentives to secretly bribe the manager to induce him to defect from
the cartel and distribute proﬁts, thereby diving the ﬁrm bankrupt and avoiding penalties for
covenant infringement. Enforcing such a one-shot illegal transaction is of course problematic.
If shareholders pay the bribe ﬁrst, the manager could keep the bribe without defecting, thereby
also earning the stream of future bonuses; if the manager defects ﬁrst, then why should the owner
ever pay the promised bribe; and such an exchange could hardly be simultaneous. When enforc-
ing the bribe/defection exchange is possible (e.g. because there is a Maﬁa providing enforcement
servicies for illegal transactions), it will be costly. The bribe should also be kept very well hidden,
as observing the manager’s defection the lender (and courts) would suspect and carefully look
for signs of the illegal transactions.26 Let β denote the bribe owners may oﬀer the manager, e
the direct cost of enforcing the illegal exchange, s the cost of keeping the bribe-against-defection
deal secret, and fm(s) and fs(s) the expected cost of being detected and sanctioned by law
enforcers respectively for the manager and the shareholders (where fm0,fs0 < 0). Given that
shareholders and managers choose optimally s∗ =m i n{s + fm(s)+fs(s)}, to accept the illegal
deal and defect the manager requires a compensation at least as large as his expected future
rents from not defecting plus his expected ﬁne, β ≥ B
r +fm(s∗). P r o p o s i t i o n3c a nt h e ne a s i l yb e
modiﬁed to encompass corruption by stating that the debt contract implements any agreement
A such that e+s∗+fs(s∗)+B






1−δ , while leaving the current statement
for the case e + s∗ + fs(s∗)+B






1−δ . T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h e s e
inequalities is increasing in the eﬀectiveness of the law enforcement system and grow further
when shareholders are dispersed (as shareholders’ coordination costs would add to enforcement
and legal costs). Therefore, we can state the following cross-country implication.
Corollary 2 .Suppose that shareholders face positive coordination costs and that corrupt deals
are mre costly (risky) with a good law enforcement system. Then caeteris paribus collusive
schemes sustained by “conservative governance structures” should be more frequent where share-
holders are more dispersed and law enforcement is better.
For the sake of crispness, in the remainder of the paper we disregard owner-manager corrupt
deals, which can always be handled along the lines sketched here, but the reader should keep
in mind that in this framework bad law enforcement and corruption can have the positive side-
eﬀects to undo/prevent conservative governance structures.
26This is why it is a standard assumption in models of supervisor-agent collusion that hidden transfers imply
deadweight losses, and that the enforcement of illegal transactions, when feasible, is costly (see Tirole, 1992).
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4 Multiple lenders and “bankers on boards”
4.1 Multiple and asymmetric lenders
One might think that, with competitive credit markets a multiplicity of unrelated lenders would
greatly reduce the pro-collusive eﬀects of debt. So what if no lender or coalition of lenders is
large enough or willing to completely ﬁnance both ﬁrms?
4.1.1 Multiple lenders
Suppose that each ﬁrm i is ﬁnanced by a pool of many, say Ni independent banks, that the loan
market is competitive, and that only one bank is in both pools (or is allied to one of the banks
in the other pool), holding a share γi, where 0 <γ i < 1, of each ﬁrm i’s debt.
As a benchmark, consider ﬁrst the case of equal involvement of the common (allied) lender(s)
with the two competing ﬁrms, so that γi = γj = γ. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose common/allied lenders have a share γ of ﬁrms’ debt. Then, by raising
high levels of covenant-protected debt (with bi = πB
i = πM
i − Bi, ∀i)o w n e r sc a n :
(i) Make managerial contracts renegotiation-proof and implement the joint monopoly collu-







(ii) For any γ>0, they make managerial contracts renegotiation-proof and implement the
joint monopoly collusive agreement as the unique collusive equilibrium at higher discount rates
than the maximum at which owners could sustain it.
Moreover, accepting the debt contract is a (strictly) dominant strategy for each owner.
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To understand the role of asymmetries in the common lender’s claims towards competing ﬁrms
we let here γi 6= γj.
T h ec a s eo fasingle common lender is straightforward. The pro-collusive eﬀect of debt
a p p l i e so n l ya sl o n ga si tp r e v e n t sd e v i a t i o n sf r o mboth ﬁrms. When γi >γ j, the common lender
(or the couple of allied lenders) loses less when ﬁrm i deviates than when ﬁrm j does, hence the
cost of a secret renegotiation that leads the manager to deviate from a collusive agreement is
smaller for ﬁrm i. Because owners of ﬁrm j are aware of this, they will stick to collusion only if
ﬁrm i0s cost of secret renegotiation (increasing in γj) is high enough to prevent it. It follows that




, and therefore is
maximal when γi = γj.
This reasoning can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 5 Given the total amount of the common lender’s claims, the pro-collusive eﬀect
of debt decreases with the asymmetry in ﬁrms’ loans.
At ﬁrst glance one might think of this result as a practical ‘rule of thumb’ to distinguish
between cases where common lending may and may not have serious anti-competitive conse-
quences. However, such a rule of thumb would be misleading, since it applies only to the case
of a single common lender (or a single set of allied lenders).
In fact, consider the case of more than one common lender. Suppose that, say, two of
the Ni and Nj lenders, named L1 and L2, a r ei nb o t hp o o l so fc r e d i t o r s . L e tγh
i ,h∈ {1,2},
denote the share of lender h0s total loans to the industry that goes to ﬁrm i, and suppose that
the common lenders’ exposure is strongly asymmetric, so that each lender specializes by lending
much more to one ﬁrm than to the other.
We obtain the following.
17Proposition 6 Suppose two (or more) lenders are in common but are specialized with (i.e.










That is, with many common lenders what matters is the asymmetry of total claims from
common lenders. When a common lender is specialized with one ﬁrms, he suﬀers a big loss
if secret renegotiation followed by a deviation takes place for the ﬁrm with which he is not
specialized. Therefore, when two common lenders are specialized with diﬀerent ﬁrms, for each
ﬁrm there will be one non-specialized common lender with a strong interest in blocking secret
renegotiation. This guarantees against renegotiation in both ﬁrms and allows collusion to be
implemented. In this situation, a rule of thumb based on the asymmetry of each common lender’s













j, which is satisﬁed when
γ1
i = γ2
j is very large and γ1
j = γ2
i is very small. Hence with more than one common lender, what
would appear to be a “marginal” degree of common lending because of the extreme asymmetry
at each lender’s claims, has the strongest possible anti-competitive eﬀect.27
4.2 ‘Bankers on boards’ and independent lenders
In this section we show that another device, also often observed in reality, can replicate the eﬀects
of a debt covenant allowing the lender(s) to confer credibility to commitments to ‘conservative
management’. Firms can set up a Board of directors and confer this the right to choose the
CEO and his incentive scheme, complying with most existing (and fashionable) “Corporate
Governance Codes.” By serving on ﬁrms’ Boards as outside directors, lenders will then be in
the position to observe any proposed change of management’s incentives.
4.2.1 ‘Bankers on boards’ with common/allied lenders
Suppose the debt contract does not assign lenders formal control rights on the choice of managers
and their incentives, but that the lender sits on borrowers’ Board of Directors. Suppose further
that — by ﬁrms’ charter — it is the Board that hires, ﬁres, and determines the compensation of top
managers, so that directors must be informed in advance of any proposed change in managers’
incentives. We obtain the following.
Proposition 7 Suppose the lender(s) is represented on ﬁrms’ boards, or has the right to be
informed when boards renegotiate managers’ contracts.
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i of ﬁrm i
0sd e b ti sc o o p e r a t i n gw i t hal e n d e rL
1
j ∈ Nj holding γ
1
j of ﬁrm j
0s debt, and the same happens
with two other lenders L
2
i ∈ Ni and L
2
j ∈ Nj, a highly pro-collusive degree of common lending appears even more
marginal, if it appears at all (most cooperative relations between banks are implicit and carefully concealed to
outsiders).
18high levels of debt (with bi = πM
i − Bi = πB
i , ∀i) make managerial contracts renegotiation-
proof and implement the joint monopoly agreement in the product market as the unique subgame
perfect stationary collusive equilibrium.




r accepting the debt contract is owners’ (strictly) dom-
inant strategy.
As when covenants give them veto power on renegotiation, when corruption is too expansive
common/allied lenders sitting on ﬁrms’ Boards can solve their enforcement and coordination
problems, implementing the joint monopoly agreement as the unique collusive equilibrium in
the otherwise competitive product market. As long as the common lender sits on the Board
of Directors he knows per time when a ﬁrm’s shareholders plan to renegotiate their manager’s
compensation and can block it by credibly threatening to reveal it to the competing ﬁrm (who
would immediately react by defecting and nullifying gains from renegotiation). The condition
in the proposition ensures that the lender’s threat of revealing the other ﬁrm that contract
renegotiation is occurring is a credible one (right hand side inequality), and that the lender is
eﬀectively interested in blocking renegotiation (left hand side inequality). As long as πNC
i >π M
j ,
which is satisﬁed for many speciﬁcations of the underlying game, the condition is satisﬁed when
(1) is not.28
Again, the result is independent of competitive conditions on the loan market: as for debt
covenants, whether the credit market is competitive or contestable will only aﬀect the distribu-
tion of collusive rents and the incentive to take the initiative.
4.2.2 No common lenders: networks of indirectly interlocking directors
Suppose now that our ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by distinct and fully independent lenders, and that
lenders have no men on the borrowers’ boards, nor veto power nor rights to be informed of
the renegotiation of managers’ contracts. Assume that each duopolist is ﬁnanced by a distinct
lender, each lender belongs to a distinct business group (e.g. a pyramid), and business groups
are fully independent and rival, that is, they behave non-cooperatively towards each other. Still,
it may happen (or be made to happen) that among the companies in business group Gi, to which
ﬁrm i’s lender Li belongs, there is a ﬁrm, say the insurance company Ii, in business relation
(e.g. regularly supplying products) to ﬁrm j. Analogously, among the companies in business
group Gj —t ow h i c hﬁrm j’s lender Lj belongs — there may be, say, the shipping company Tj
who regularly sells services to ﬁrm i. Since Ii is a business partner of ﬁrm j, nobody would be
surprised to ﬁnd a representative of ﬁrm Ii (that is, of group Gi) on the board of directors of
ﬁrm j;a n dt h es a m ec a nb es a i df o raTj’s (therefore Gj’s) man on ﬁrm i’s board. This situation
is represented in Figure 1.
It is easy to derive the consequences of such a (common) situation. Without proof, one can
state what follows.
28Because of the condition to be satisﬁed, the pro-collusive eﬀect characterized here appears weaker than the
one of debt covenants characterized in Proposition 3. However, it is easy to verify that the condition become
much weaker when there are more common/allied lenders each specialized with a diﬀerent ﬁrm, as described in
Section 4.1.2, and that it is always satisﬁed (so that the statement of Proposition 3 would hold also for “bankers
on boards” without covenants) when the asymmetry is substantial. Similarly, it would be easy to show that the
condition is weakened — so that the threat of revealing renegotiation is credible for at higher discount rates —
when the bank borrow to many industries, so that they can build a reputation for not “holding up” its borrowers




























Proposition 8 Suppose that there are no common/allied lenders, and that lenders have no seats
on ﬁrms’ boards, nor veto power, nor rights to be informed of managerial contracts’ renegotiation.
As long as on each ﬁrm’s board sits a loyal member of the business group that (directly or
indirectly) controls the lender of the competing ﬁrm, managerial contracts are credible commit-
ments and bonus contracts with πB
i = πM
i implement the joint monopoly agreement as the unique
subgame perfect collusive equilibrium in the product market at any level of the discount rate.
To reduce lender Li’s losses, group Gi’s man on ﬁrm j’s board would immediately inform
ﬁrm i of any renegotiation of managerial contract that might lead ﬁrm j to unilaterally deviate
from a collusive agreement, and vice versa. A ﬁrm informed that the other ﬁrm is renegotiating
its contractual precommitment to a prudent behavior would immediately react abandoning the
collusive agreement, thereby nullifying all gains from renegotiation.
Note, though, that although indirectly interlinked directors may in principle replicate the
eﬀects of common/allied lenders, when the number of ﬁrms in the oligopoly grows this mechanism
becomes unfeasible, as it requires that the size of each ﬁrm board grows along with the number
of ﬁrms.29
29At the beginning of the century, J.P. Morgan had directors on the boards of some thirty ﬁrms in the transport
industry (railways, shipping companies, etc.). If these ﬁrms were to coordinate through a network of indirectly
interlocking directors rather than through a common lender, then each ﬁrm’s board would have to be composed
of more than thirty directors.
205 Extensions, policy implications, and related literature
5.1 Extensions
Other stakeholders. There is a debate on the role of Stakeholders in ﬁrms’ governance, and
several problems linked to the idea of a “stakeholders’ society” have already been spelled out, for
example by Jean Tirole (2001). Our results highlight additional problems linked to the inﬂuence
of organized stakeholders on ﬁrms’ governance. Any industry-wide stakeholder other than a
bank can facilitate downstream industries’ monopolization when given suﬃcient inﬂuence on
ﬁrms’ choices. In Germany, for example, industry-wide trade unions have seats on ﬁrms’ boards
and a strong say on the choice of top managers and their compensation. In light of our results, it
is clear that these unions can easily substitute or complement banks in the coordinating role we
described, with shareholders, debtholders and managers sharing the collusive rent with unionized
employees. Similar considerations of course apply to networks of common shareholders and for
ﬁrms that themselves have cross-shareholdings.30
Entry. A ﬁnancial entry deterrence eﬀect fully analogous to that in Bhattacharya and Chiesa
(1995), Cestone and White (2003) and Hellmann and Da Rin (2002) emerges in our model if
one assumes that while bank and ﬁrms are sustaining a collusive equilibrium among those we
characterized, a potential entrant unexpectedly overcomes other barriers and asks for ﬁnance
to enter the industry. If the collusive agreement maximizes joint bank-ﬁrms-managers proﬁts,
then it is a dominant strategy for the bank not to ﬁnance the entrant (he could not increase
discounted industry proﬁts but would claim part of them, reducing incumbents’ proﬁts and the
value of existing loans without bringing any potential beneﬁt (a formal extension of the model
showing this would be rather trivial). However, contrary to the pro-collusive eﬀects characterized
in previous sections this ﬁnancial entry deterrence eﬀect is limited to extremely concentrated
or underdeveloped credit market: in all these models it is suﬃcient that a second comparable
lender is present, just one more bank with analogous skills and cost of funds, that ﬁnancial entry
deterrence disappears all together.31
5.2 Policy implications
Competition policy. To our knowledge, no competition authority in this world pays attention
to who is lending to oligopolistic ﬁrms suspected of price-ﬁxing, and to who is sitting on their
boards of directors. The model suggests that this is unfortunate. We have shown that a common
lender, a coalition of allied lenders, or even fully independent and competing lenders with ﬁrm-
interlocking directorships can easily monopolize an otherwise competitive downstream product
market. The result is a “hidden horizontal merger” which has worse social welfare consequences
than a real horizontal merger.32 When there is suspicion of price coordination in an oligopolistic
30It is “folk wisdom” in Industrial Organization that the more cross-(or common-)shareholdings is present in an
oligopoly, static or dynamic, the less competitive is the product-market outcome (a formal model of this relation
would be trivial).
31The obvious reason is that if the bank funding the incumbent(s) refuses to ﬁnance the entrant, the second
bank will do it as long as entry is proﬁtable. Consistently, Cetorelli (2002) ﬁnds that credit market concentration
induces industry concentration in countries with underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets, but that the eﬀet disappears
for countries with developed ones.
32A real merger to monopoly might bring about eﬃciency gains, besides market monopolization, while common,
allied, or interlocking lenders can only monopolize the product market.
21industry, competition authorities should check who is ﬁnancing oligopolistic ﬁrms and who is
sitting on their boards; and in the case of diﬀerent lenders, what is the ultimate relation between
them (e.g. do lenders belong to the same pyramid, are there cross-shareholdings?).
Bank competition and ﬁnancial stability. Most previous work on the eﬀects of banking
competition on ﬁnancial stability highlights its negative impact in terms of increased incentives
to take risks (Michael Keeley 1990; Carmen Matutes and Xavier Vives, 1996; Hellmann et al.
2000), and reduced incentives to screen prospective borrowers (Thorsten Broecker, 1990; Michael
Riordan, 1993). The policy prescriptions originating from these contributions is limiting bank
competition to balance welfare gains from increased ﬁnancial stability and eﬃciency losses from
market power i nt h ec r e d i tm a r k e to n l y . And indeed, for the sake of ﬁnancial stability, regulators
have been very conservative in terms of encouraging competition in the banking sector in the
last decades (with few notable exceptions). Our results imply that this policy attitude is biased
against credit market competition, since it disregards the concentrated credit market’s ability
to soften competition and innovation in the whole real sector.
Bank mergers and universal banks. In evaluating the eﬀects of the recent wave of mergers
in the banking industry, concerns about the increase in concentration are typically limited to
the cost of market power in the credit market only (see e.g. Jean Dermine, 2000). Again, this
policy attitude appears too accommodating towards banks’ supermergers, since it overlooks the
additional welfare costs linked to large banks’ greater ability to curb competition in downstream
industries.
Also, there has been a policy debate on whether in the US the Glass-Steagall Act’s (1933)
prohibition of banks’ shareholdings in industrial ﬁrms should be relaxed (see e.g. Anthony
Saunders, 1994). One of the major concerns has been the question whether such a reform could
“...recreate the cartels of [J.P.] Morgan’s day?” (The Economist, Feb. 1st 1997). This paper
shows that this concern should not be dismissed too easily. Shareholdings reinforce banks’
inﬂuence on borrowing ﬁrms’ decisions. According to our results, stronger bank inﬂuence can
facilitate the monopolization of downstream product markets.
5.3 Related literature
Besides work mentioned in the introduction, the paper is related to most previous research on
the interaction between ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure and product market competition. It stands in
contrast to the two most established theories on the subject, the “long purse” and the “limited
liability” ones. According to John McGee’s (1958) and Lester Telser’s (1966) “long purse” or
“deep pockets” theory, when some ﬁrms issue debt, their unleveraged competitors will ﬁnd it
convenient to engage in a market war in order to drive them bankrupt and eventually out of
the market.33 According to Brander and Lewis’ (1986) “limited liability” theory, the “asset
substitution” problem highlighted by Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976) should lead
shareholders of leveraged ﬁrms to disregard low product market states — from which they are
protected by limited liability — and choose overly aggressive product market strategies.34 These
theories cannot explain the evidence mentioned in the introduction, as their natural implication
33This argument has been formalized in models of “predation,” for example, by Jean-Pierre Benoit (1984),
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1986), and Patrick Bolton and David Scharfstein (1990).
34This argument was also made by Maksimovic (1986). The strictly related argument that owners’ limited
liability limits leveraged ﬁrms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion was developed by Maksimovic (1988), and extended
by Rune Stenbacka (1994) and Ulrich Hege (1998).
22is that debt ﬁnance should increase product market competition by leading either leveraged
ﬁrms or their competitors to behave more aggressively.
The paper perhaps closest in spirit to our work is Poitevin (1989), which focuses on the
coordinating role of a common lender in a one-shot oligopoly.35 Both this paper and Poitevin
(1989) are related to the work of Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1985), who showed
that a common (marketing) agent can be used by competing ﬁrms to facilitate tacit collusion.
The ﬁrst part of our paper builds on the literature on strategic delegation which — extending
Thomas Schelling’s (1960) insight that contracts with third parties can have strategic eﬀects —
explores the commitment value of managerial incentives in oligopolistic environments.36
The model is related to the literature on banks as ‘gatekeepers’ of product markets pioneered
by Sudipto Bhattacharya and Gabriella Chiesa (1995), analyzing the eﬀects of a monopolist
lender on downstream industries by focussing on entry, rather than behavior. Bhattacharya and
Chiesa show that a common lender internalizes market externalities between borrowing ﬁrms,
facilitating information-sharing in R&D and ensuring that only one ﬁrm enters the product
market. Similarly, Giacinta Cestone and Lucy White (2003) show that a monopolist/dominant
bank would neglect ﬁnance to potential product market entrant when it is already ﬁnancing an
incumbent ﬁrm, and that banks are more prone to exclude entrants when they hold equity in
the incumbent.37 We discuss entry in Section 6, where we note that a similar deterrence eﬀect
emerges also in our model, but that contrary to the eﬀects on collusion, ﬁnancial entry deterrence
can only be relevant when credit markets are extremely concentrated/underdeveloped.
The paper contributes to the debate on the relation between ﬁnance, competition and innova-
tion. From a product market point of view, Shumpeterian theories suggest that monopoly rents
foster innovation and growth.38 Empirical evidence, however, indicates that robust competition
improves ﬁrms’ performance and stimulates innovation.39 Our model suggests that competition
in credit markets may foster innovation by hindering collusive underinvestment agreements in
product markets. Alexander Gershenkron (1962) argued that size and market power facilitated
the coordinating and investment-fostering role that banks played in the early stages of the Ger-
man and Italian industrialization.40 Our paper looks at the other face of the coin by focussing on
mature industries with several established incumbents, where a concentrated/collusive banking
sector can play another ‘coordinating role’: helping incumbents maintain proﬁtable collusive
35Within a two-stage model analogous to Brander and Lewis (1986), Poitevin shows that when ﬁrms borrow
from a common lender their overly aggressive product market behavior may be reduced by a suitable choice of
the interest rates. Still, in his model the overall eﬀect of debt ﬁnance remains pro-competitive.
36Classical references include John Vickers (1985); Chaim Fershtman and Kenneth Judd, (1987); and Steven
Sklivas, (1987). Our approach is perhaps closest to Spagnolo (2000), where the dynamic eﬀects of managerial
incentives are analized.
37Thomas Hellmann and Marco DaRin (2002) reach the same two conclusions in an extension of their “big
push” model. On the contrary, Stefan Arping (2002) ﬁnds that if the bank holds a moderate equity stake in the
incumbent ﬁrm, it may be more prone to ﬁnance rivals, increasing pro d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e i t i o n .
38See e.g. Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, (1992). More recently, Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick
Rey (1999a) obtain a positive relation between competition and innovation by introducing agency costs and
conservative managers in a Schumpeterian growth model.
39See e.g. Martin Baily and Hans Gersbach (1995), Richard Blundell et al. (1995), and Stephen Nickell (1996).
Aghion et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. A collusive
agreement would place any industry at the left edge of the inverted-U.
40Hellman and DaRin (2002) provide a formal model of this idea. The related ‘micro’ theory by Mitchel Petersen
and Raghuram Rajan (1995) suggests that without market power banks would not ﬁnance small ﬁrms, as they
could not recover the cost of the initial risky investment when ﬁrms grow and become proﬁtable (ﬁrms could then
switch to competing banks).
23arrangements.
Finally, the model has implications for bank specialization.41 Bank specialization automati-
cally leads to situations where several competing ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by the same bank. Here we
show that there may be important additional beneﬁts for banks to specialize on a certain type
of borrowers, over and above informational ones. It will become clear that the model is relevant
to a number of other literatures, including those on pyramids and business groups, on Boards
of directors, on interlocking directorships and on the role of stakeholders in a market economy.
Other theories have been proposed to rationalize the positive empirical relation between
leverage and markups often found in product markets. For example, Jacob Glazer (1994),
Dean Showalter (1995), Antoine Faure-Grimaud (2000), and Erlend Nier (1998) obtain anti-
competitve eﬀects of debt ﬁnance by modifying the assumptions of Brander and Lewis’ (1986)
model. And Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Rey (1999b) develop a model
where entrepreneurs can commit towards ﬁnance providers to increase eﬀort at a cost, and ﬁnd
that an increase in external ﬁnance may either increase or decrease competition in oligopolistic
product markets, depending on its initial level.
None of these paper deals with the relation between debt ﬁnance and ﬁrms’ ability to sustain
tacit collusion in dynamic competition. On this issue, the "state of the art" is the work of
Maksimovic (1988, 1995), Stenbaka (1994) and Hege (1998), according to which debt always
hinders ﬁrms’ ability to sustain collusve agreements.
6 Concluding remarks: testable predictions
In this paper we have questioned the established view that debt ﬁnance hinders ﬁrms’ ability
to sustain collusive behavior in product markets. We have shown that by controlling borrowers’
choice of managers and managerial incentives, a concentrated or collusive banking sector can
implement collusion and monopolize otherwise competitive downstream product markets. Even
when the banking sector is competitive and ﬁrms have multiple lenders, having either common or
allied lenders, or even independent lenders with interlocking directors facilitate collusive behavior
among oligopolistic ﬁrms.
The model generates several testable predictions. It implies, ceteris paribus, that where
credit markets are more competitive product markets should also be more competitive and R&D
investment should be more intense; that large banks (or coalitions of banks) that specialize with
particular industries, especially with concentrated ones, should be relatively more proﬁtable;
and conversely that markups should be higher and R&D investment lower in industries where
large industry-specialized banks are present. An other implication is that managerial rents and
pro-collusive low-powered incentive schemes should be more common where industry leverage
is positively related to ﬁrms’ markups. In cross-country studies, this correlation should be
increasing with the concentration in credit markets and the predominance of bank ﬁnance.
The model also predicts a positive relation between dense networks of (directly and indirectly)
interlocked directors and industry markups. Finally, an indirect implication of the model is that
the highest quality managers should leave countries with highly concentrated credit markets,
since their competitive and innovative skills are less valued in these collusive environments.
41Andrew Winton (1999), Heidrun Hoppe and Ulrich Lehman-Grube (2002), and Alex Stomper (2001) showed
from diﬀerent perspectives that banks may have strong informational incentives to specialize, functionally or
geographically.
247 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. With regard to the stage game, managers’ compensation under proﬁt—
sharing contracts is a monotone transformation of their ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions; that is, managers’
objective function is a monotone transformation of owners’ objective function. The set of Nash
equilibria of a game is not aﬀected by monotone transformations of payoﬀ functions because
these generate ordinally equivalent games. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Statement (i) follows from (2) and (3) being equivalent to (1). State-
ment (ii) follows from (3a) being always strictly less stringent than (2). Statement (iii) follows



























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Since for collusion to be sustainable it must be bi ≤ πA
i , (1)
not being satisﬁed, or being satisﬁed as a strict equality, implies that short-run gains from a




















Then, if managers can retain all proﬁts after a deviation they have suﬃcient funds to avoid
bankruptcy, in which case the relevant condition for collusion being sustainable is (3), which
reduces exactly to (1). It follows that when managers under NPS contract can retain all proﬁts,
collusion cannot be sustained when (1) is not satisﬁed, but it can be sustained when (1) holds
as equality. Finally, suppose (1) is strictly satisﬁed. Then, when bi = πA
i bankruptcy cannot
be avoided after a deviation, the condition for a manager under NPS being willing to collude is
(3a) if managers are replaced after bankruptcy and (3b) if they are not, these condition are also





































= r∗ ⇔ Ci >α
bi
r∗,
and statement (i) follows. To prove (ii), suppose that managers are committed to pay out as
dividends a fraction 0 <β<1 of net proﬁts, when these are positive. Then, even when (1) is
not satisﬁed, when bi = πA
i and








a deviating manager will not be able to avoid bankruptcy. In this case, even though (1) is not
satisﬁed, the condition for a manager under NPS being willing to collude is (3a) if managers are





r∗, collusion can be sustained by leveraged ﬁrms but not by unleveraged ones. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Part A. Suppose the manager is under penalty contracts and
unconstrained with regard to dividend policy. Then, when (1) is not satisﬁed, a deviating
manager can avoid bankruptcy by retaining short-run proﬁts from the deviation forever, invest
them at the market rate r, and pay the debt’s coupons. Given his ﬂat wage, he is indiﬀerent
between respecting a collusive agreement and deviating, and therefore chooses to deviate to
maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. On the other hand, when (1) is satisﬁed, if bi >π NC
i a deviation
drives the deviating ﬁrm bankrupt in the following period. Then the manager strictly prefers to








which, because the manager’s individual rationality constraint requires W ≥ 0, is always sat-
isﬁed. Suppose instead that the manager cannot retain proﬁts forever, that he is constrained
to distribute (part or all) net proﬁts to shareholders. Then, even when (1) is not satisﬁed, if
bi >π NC
i the market war that follows a deviation may drive also the deviating ﬁrm bankrupt,
so that the condition for the manager being willing to support a collusive agreement is the one
above, which is always satisﬁed.
Part B. Suppose all managers are under bonus contracts with πB
i = πA
i and Bi > 0. Consider
the following strategies for managers: “respect collusive agreement A (leading to per-period
proﬁt πA
i ) as long as all other managers do it; if a defection is observed, play the static Nash
equilibrium of the oligopoly game forever after.” This is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
repeated oligopoly game played by managers because each manager i under bonus contract with
πB
i > 0 ﬁnds it convenient to respect any agreement such that πB
i ≤ πA
i , whatever the discount
rate is. By sticking to the agreement a manager expects total discounted expected payoﬀs Wi+Bi
1−δ .
A unilateral deviation from any such collusive agreement leaves the manager’s wage unaﬀected,
allows him to get the bonus in the period of the deviation, but triggers a punishment phase
during which proﬁts are zero and the bonus is not paid. Discounted expected payoﬀsf r o mt h e
unilateral deviation are therefore Bi + Wi
1−δ, with a net loss of δ Bi
1−δ. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .After the contract is concluded and debt is issued by both owners, if
collusion is sustained each period then owners get πA
i −bi−Bi, managers get Bi, and the lender
gets bi+bj. If instead one owner persuades the manager to deviate, that owner gets b πA
i −bi−Bi
immediately and πNC






r > 0.I fa
manager deviates he loses future bonuses Bi
r , and must be compensated for such loss in order to
be persuaded to deviate. Regarding the lender, we must distinguish two cases. When bi ≤ πA
i ,
if a ﬁrm deviates the competing ﬁrm does not go bankrupt. Then the lender loses and gains
nothing from a deviation, since even during the punishment phase owners can repay the debt. It
follows that an owner has just to compensate the manager in order to renegotiate the contract,







i − Bi − πNC
i
r








which is never satisﬁed, since the RHS is strictly positive according to our assumption that
condition (1) is not satisﬁed. Statement (i) follows. When πNC
i >b i >π A
i ,i faﬁrm deviates the
26other ﬁrm goes bankrupt. Then, when a deviation occurs the lender loses immediately bi − πA
i







r ≥ bi − πA
i the lender will also have incentives to induce one
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debt makes the managers’ contracts renegotiation-proof when
Bi
r




























P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . After debt is issued, managers can sustain a collusive agreement
delivering per-period proﬁts πA
i ≥ πB
i , i nw h i c hc a s ee a c hp e r i o do w n e r sg e tπA
i − bi − Bi,
managers get Bi, and the lender gets bi + bj. To have the lender and the manager agree to
a contract renegotiation that leads the manager to deviate, the owner must compensate both
of them for their expected losses from the deviation. When a manager deviates unilaterally,
his owner i gets b πA






r , strictly positive according to Assumption 2. If the manager distributes
gains from deviation as dividends, the lender of the deviating ﬁrm i loses bj − πA
j from the
non-deviating ﬁrm’s immediate default on debt-service payments, the discounted expected ﬂow











r , since in the period after the deviation the deviating ﬁrm earns only πNC
i <b i and
therefore goes also bankrupt. (Alternatively, the manager of the deviating ﬁrm may choose to
avoid bankruptcy, either by retaining part of the short-run gains from deviations to pay future
coupons, or by buying back all debt immediately; in both cases nothing changes, since avoiding




r , exactly as when bankruptcy occurs.)
If a manager deviates unilaterally, he loses the ﬂow of future bonuses Bi
r whether or not his
ﬁrm goes bankrupt. The managerial contract is renegotiation-proof if an owner’s gains from a
unilateral deviation in the product market are not suﬃcient to compensate both the manager
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i is increasing in bj, and by direct comparison with inequality (1) rD
i >r ∗
i for
every bj >π NC
j . This proves statement (i).
When b πA
i − πA
i − (bj − πA










i +( bj − πNC
j )
is always satisﬁed because its LHS is weakly negative and
πA
i − πNC
i +( bj − πNC
j ) > 0.
Statement (ii) follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The ﬁrst statement follows straightforwardly from part B of
Proposition 2 together with Lemma 4. For the second statement, consider owners’ expected
payoﬀs when a debt contract is oﬀered. If both owners accept the deal each of them gets
Di = bi
r −gi immediately and expects net proﬁts πM




r − gi. If both owners refuse the deal, they remain stuck at the static
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for ever. If one owner, say j, accepts but owner i does not, collusion
cannot be supported and ﬁrms are again stuck at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. However,
while the ﬁrm that refuses the deal gets expected proﬁts
πNC
i
r , the ﬁrm that accepts it gets
Dj =
bj





in each future period.
When bi = πB
i = πM
i − Bi owners’ expected payoﬀs matrix in the “capital structure game” is


































accepting the debt contract is owners’ strictly dominant strategy. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. If one ﬁrm renegotiates its manager’s contract to induce him
to deviate, the lender observes it through his man on the board. To block renegotiation, the
lender can threaten to reveal that renegotiation is occurring to the other ﬁrm, which would react
and nullify the renegotiating ﬁrm’s gains from deviation in the product market. If it does so,
the Cournot-Nash outcome occurs, both ﬁrms go bankrupt, and the lender receives πNC
i +πNC
j




r . If it does not, the lender gets
immediately πM
j from the side of the non-deviating ﬁrm, some compensation P for its silence
from the deviating ﬁrm, where P ≤ b πM
i − Bi − Bi
r (Bi is the deviating manager’s bonus, and
Bi





r . Therefore, the lender’s threat of revealing renegotiation to the




j + b πM














From the proof of Lemma 4 we know that gains from deviation are not suﬃcient to compensate























which, when bi = πM









i − B − πM
j +
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j − b πM
i − πM
j , ∀i,
the lender will oppose any secret renegotiation leading to a breach of the collusive agreement,
and can prevent it by the credible threat of revealing the renegotiation to the competing ﬁrm.





















































which, in our symmetric case reduces to πNC
i >π M
j , which is satisﬁed for most speciﬁcations
of the Cournot model. Finally, the last statement follows from the same argument made in the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .As long as gi+gj > 0 there will be competition among lenders for
this rent, and owners may use such competition to reduce the lender’s stake indeﬁnitely. Once
gi + gj =0the lenders break even, and we can assume that ﬁrms will ﬁnd at least one lender
(or one couple of allied lenders) willing to oﬀer and sign the debt contracts. The payoﬀ matrix
and the extensive form of the “capital structure game” will be as in the previous proof and, by
inspection, because gi <
πM
i −Bi
r it is a strictly dominant strategy for both owners to sign the
debt contract. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .To induce a deviation through renegotiation, owners must com-
pensate the manager for the expected loss of bonuses after the deviation, pay debtholders future
coupons, and also compensate the common lender for the extra losses due to the non-deviating
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial distress. With bi = πB
i = πM
i −Bi and without deviations, non-common lenders
together expect the full repayment streams with discounted value (1−γ)
³
πM






and the common lender expects the full repayment streams γ
³
πM














After a deviation each ﬁrm expects a ﬂow of future proﬁts
πNC
i
r . Therefore, to obtain renego-
tiation the owner of ﬁrm i the owner that ﬁrm must pay Bi






















. Then managerial contracts are renegotiation-proof
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j − Bj − πNC
j ).
As long as Bj ≤ πM
j − πNC
j , w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed since no debt contract is feasible if more




































and comparing it with (1) evaluated at πA
i = πM



















which, because Bj <π M
j − πNC
j (if managers capture all gains from collusion owners are not
interested in issuing debt in the ﬁrst place) implies γ(πM
j −πNC
j −Bj) > 0 and −γ(πM
j −πM
j −
Bj) < 0, is always satisﬁed. This proves claim (ii).





r , and the last statement follows. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .With bi = πB
i = πM
i − Bi ∀i, and without deviations, the non-






















from both ﬁrms. After a deviation the remaining value
of each ﬁrm is
πNC
i
r . As before, to have debtholders and manager agree on renegotiation the





r , plus common lenders’ compensation for their





















. Therefore, managerial contracts are renegotiation-proof and the joint
monopoly collusive agreement supportable when the following no-renegotiation conditions for
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Firms’ and agreement’s symmetry and the common managerial labor market imply that these




i). Because the conditions must
both be satisﬁed for collusion to be supported, ﬁrms’ ability to collude is constrained by the more





i) become smaller. It follows that ﬁrms’ ability to collude (the maximum









Proof of Proposition 10. Again, with bi = πB
i = πM
i −Bi ∀i, and without deviations, man-
agers expect their ﬂow of bonuses, the non-common lenders expect the full repayment streams
31with expected value (1−γ)
³
πM





, and the common lender expects full repayment
streams with expected value γ
³
πM





from both ﬁrms. To accept a renegotiation
leading to a deviation, all these parties need to be compensated for any losses from the deviation
induced by renegotiation. After the deviation the manager of deviating ﬁrm i expects no bonuses
in the future, while the remaining value of the ﬁrm after the deviation is
πNC
i
r . Therefore, to





r to compensate ﬁrm i’s
manager and creditors, plus he must compensate the common lender for the extra losses due to
the other ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial distress. After a ﬁrm i deviation, the common lender receives from the
























































By inspection, Γ(η) is increasing in η. Renegotiation is impossible and collusion is credibly
implemented as long as the following condition is satisﬁed




πM − B − πNC
r
+ Γ(η),
and since Γ(η) is increasing in η, the larger the value of η, the easier it is to satisfy the inequality
and implement collusion. Q.E.D.
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